Network theory provides a powerful tool for the representation and analysis of complex systems of interacting agents. Here we investigate the United States House of Representatives network of committees and subcommittees, with committees connected according to "interlocks" or common membership. Analysis of this network reveals clearly the strong links between different committees, as well as the intrinsic hierarchical structure within the House as a whole. We show that network theory, combined with the analysis of roll call votes using singular value decomposition, successfully uncovers political and organizational correlations between committees in the House without the need to incorporate other political information.
Introduction
Much of the detailed work in making United States law is performed by Congressional committees and subcommittees. This contrasts with parliamentary democracies such as Great Britain and Canada, where a larger part of the legislative process is directly in the hands of political parties or is conducted in sessions of the entire parliament. While the legislation drafted by committees in the U.S. Congress is subject ultimately to roll call votes by the full House and Senate, the important role played by committees and subcommittees makes the study of their formation and composition vital to understanding the work of the American legislature.
Several contrasting theories of committee assignment strategies have been developed in the political science literature (mostly through qualitative studies, although there have been some quantitative ones as well), [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] but there is no consensus explanation of how committee assignments are initially determined or of how they are modified from one session of Congress to the next. A question of particular interest is whether political parties assign committee memberships essentially at random or if important Congressional committees can be seen using objective analysis to be "stacked" with partisan party members.
The work presented here approaches these issues using a different set of analytical tools from those previously employed. We use the tools of network theory, which have been successfully applied in recent years to characterize a wide variety of complex systems. 7, 8 As we show, network theory is particularly effective at uncovering structure among committee and subcommittee assignments without the need to incorporate any specific knowledge about committee members or their political positions.
Although there has been only limited previous work on networks of Congressional committees, there is a considerable body of literature on other collaboration networks, such as the boards of directors of corporations, 9-13 which occupy a position in the business world somewhat analogous to that occupied by committees in Congress. It has been shown that board memberships and the networks they create play a major role in the spread of attitudes, ideas, and practices through the corporate world, affecting political donations, 10 investment strategies, 14 and even the stock market on which a company is listed. 15 Studies of the structure of corporate networks have shed considerable light on the mechanisms and pathways of information diffusion, [16] [17] [18] and it seems plausible that the structure of congressional committees would be similarly revealing.
Networks of committees
We study the U.S. House of Representatives and construct bipartite or "two-mode" networks based on assignments of Representatives to committees and subcommittees (henceforth called just "committees" for simplicity) in the 101st-108th Houses (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . (Table 1 lists the House leadership during this period.) These networks have two types of nodes, Representatives and committees, with edges connecting each Representative to the committees on which they sit.
We project these two-mode committee assignment networks onto one-mode networks whose nodes represent the committees and whose edges represent common membership or "interlocks"
between committees. Figure 1 shows a visualization of the network of committees for the 107th
House of Representatives (2001 Representatives ( -2002 , an example which we analyze in some depth.
The more common members two committees have, the stronger their connection in the network.
We quantify the strength of connection by the normalized interlock, defined as the number of common members divided by the expected number of such common members if committees of the same size were randomly and independently assigned from the members of the House. Committees with as many common members as would be expected by chance have normalized interlock 1, those with twice as many have interlock 2, those with none have interlock 0, and so forth.
Some of the connections depicted in Fig. 1 forming the small pentagon in the middle right of Fig. 1 .
We also find more surprising connections between committees. For instance, the 9-member Select 
Structure of the House
Connections between committees can be quantified in greater detail by applying the technique of single linkage clustering. 19 Starting with the complete set of committees for a given Congress, committees are joined together sequentially starting with the pair with the greatest normalized interlock, followed by the next greatest, and so forth. This process generates "clusters" of committees, which can be represented using a tree or dendrogram, such as that shown in Fig. 2 for the 107th
House. There appear to be essentially four hierarchical levels of clusters within this dendrogram:
subcommittees, committees, groups of committees, and finally the entire House. 
Voting patterns
A further twist can be introduced by considering how the network of interlocks between committees is related to the political positions of their constituent Representatives. One way to characterize political positions is to tabulate individuals' voting records on key issues, but such a method is subjective by nature and a method that involves less personal judgment on the observer's part is preferable. Here we use a singular value decomposition (SVD) 21 of voting records. [22] [23] [24] Other data mining methods can also be used (see http://www.ailab.si/aleks/Politics/).
We define an n × m voting matrix B with one row for each of the n Representatives in the House and one column for each of the m votes taken during the session. For instance, the 107th House had n = 444 Representatives (including mid-term replacements) and took m = 990 roll call votes.
The element B ij is +1 if Representative i voted "yea" on vote j and −1 if he or she voted "nay".
If a Representative did not vote because of absence or abstention, the corresponding element is 0.
The SVD identifies groups of Representatives who voted in a similar fashion on many votes.
The grouping that has the largest mean-square overlap with the actual groups voting for or against each measure is given by the leading (normalized) eigenvector u (1) of the matrix B T B, the next largest by the second eigenvector, and so on. 21, 24 If we denote by σ 2 k the corresponding eigenvalues (which are provably non-negative) and by v (k) the normalized eigenvectors of BB T (which have the same eigenvalues), then it can be shown that
and that the matrix B (r) with elements
approximates the full voting matrix B, with the sum of the squares of the errors on the elements equal to n k=r+1 σ 2 k , which vanishes in the limit r → n. Assuming the quantities σ k , which are called the singular values, are ordered such that σ 1 ≥ σ 2 ≥ σ 3 . . ., this means that B (r) will be an excellent approximation to the original voting matrix if the singular values fall off sufficiently rapidly with increasing k.
Alternatively, one can say that the kth term in the singular value decomposition (1) accounts
107th House, we find that the leading eigenvector accounts for about 45.3% of the voting matrix, the second eigenvector accounts for about 29.6%, and no other eigenvector accounts for more than 1.6%. Thus, to an excellent approximation, a Representative's voting record can be characterized by just two coordinates, measuring the extent to which they align (or do not align) with the groups represented by the first two eigenvectors. That is,
is a good approximation to B ij . Similar results are obtained for other sessions of Congress, with two eigenvectors giving a good approximation to the voting matrix in every case. It has been shown previously using other methods that Congressional voting positions are well-approximated by just two coordinates (see voteview.com), but the SVD does so in a particularly simple fashion directly from the roll call data. In Fig. 3 , we plot the two coordinates for every member of the House of Representatives for each of the 102nd-107th Congresses.
We find that the leading eigenvector * corresponds closely to the acknowledged political party affiliation of the Representatives, with Democrats (×) on the left and Republicans (•) on the right in the plots. We therefore call this the "partisan coordinate" and Representatives who score highly on it-either positively or negatively-tend often to vote with members of their own party.
From the partisan coordinate, we also compute a measure of "extremism" for each Representative as the absolute value of their partisan coordinate relative to the mean partisan score of the full House. That is, we define the extremism e i of a Representative by e i = |p i − µ|, where p i is the Representative's partisan coordinate and µ is the mean of that coordinate for the entire House (which is usually skewed slightly towards the majority party). In Table 2 , we list the most and least partisan Representatives from each party computed from the roll call of the 107th House.
We also compare our rank orderings to those obtained using an alternative method, the Optimal Classification (OC) technique of Poole and Rosenthal 23 (also applied only to the 107th House).
In contrast, the second eigenvector groups essentially all Representatives together regardless of party affiliation and thus appears to represent voting actions in which most members of the House either approve or disapprove of a motion simultaneously. We call this the "bipartisan coordinate,"
as Representatives who score highly on it tend often to vote with the majority of the House.
Using our SVD results, we can also calculate the positions of the votes (as opposed to the voters) along the same two leading dimensions to quantify the nature of the issues being decided.
We show this for the 107th House in Fig The SVD analysis gives a simple way of classifying Representatives' voting positions without making subjective judgments. In Fig. 2 
Conclusions
To conclude, a network theory approach coupled with an SVD analysis of roll call votes is demonstrably useful in analyzing organizational structure in the committees of the U.S. House of Representatives. We have found evidence of several levels of hierarchy within the network of committees and-without incorporating any knowledge of political events or positions-identified some close connections between committees, such as that between the House Rules Committee and the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the 107th Congress, as well as correlations between committee assignments and Representatives' political positions. Our analysis of committee interlocks and voting patterns strongly suggests that committee assignments are not determined at random (i.e., that some committees are indeed "stacked") and also indicates the degree of departure from randomness. We have discussed here a few observations in detail, but a rich variety of other results can be derived from similar analyses. We hope that further studies using similar techniques will provide key insights into the structure of the House of Representatives and other political bodies. U  TI  C  S   EN  VI  RO  NM  EN  T,  TE  CH  NO  LO  GY  ,  AN  D  ST  AN  DA 
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